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This paper investigates the potentials of the private sector in the development and management of 
sanitation infrastructure and services within three Sub metros in the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly 
(KMA). A case study approach was used and data on public toilets under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
and franchise management were collected. Results showed that users of BOT facilities were generally 
satisfied with the services they receive but the KMA-owned toilets under franchised management receive 
low patronage because of the poor management and political interference. Some factors plaguing the 
partnership include mistrust between the partners, political interference and socio-cultural behaviour of 
the users. 
 
 
Introduction  
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the private 
sector to achieve a common objective while both players pursue their own individual interests (Pessoa, 
2007).  The factors that affect PPPs include the degree of mutuality of interest between the actors 
concerning the specific goal of the partnership, trust among the partners, mutual accountability and 
transparency, effective and able leadership of the partnership arrangement. Furthermore, a strong political 
will is needed to support partnership activities in the long run. According to Mwangi (2002), successful 
partnerships should provide an efficient way of identifying different and changing needs; adequate trust 
between partners; clarity concerning the purpose of the partnership and the individual roles of partners 
within it; adequate leadership; possibilities of all partners to fulfil their roles; adequate access by all partners 
to essential information; necessary financial and other resources; compatibility with the prevailing political 
and legal climate; potential for wider application.  
Despite the increasing role of PPP in infrastructure development, Kumasi still faces sanitation challenges 
in terms of coverage and access to sanitation. In Kumasi sanitation coverage is clearly inadequate: 38.8% of 
Kumasi’s population relies on public toilets, over three-quarters of the population rely on shared toilet 
facilities, and tens of thousands of urban residents rely on open defecation (Thrift, 2007; Maoulidi, 2010).  
The recent census also reveals that 2.5% of inhabitants in KMA have no facilities, 38.8% use public toilets 
and KVIP, 0.3% Private bucket/pan latrine (GSS, 2013). This development therefore calls for concern on 
how the private operators are performing in their involvement in the sanitation services provision in 
achieving the MDGs target (Dima, 2004). As of 2000, most of the toilet management contracts were in the 
hands of Assembly Members (Ayee and Crook 2003).  
A study was conducted in 2012 to examine the PPP arrangement to provide sanitation infrastructure and 
services, specifically public toilets and sewerage services in three sub metros within KMA . The objective of 
the study was to assess the roles of partners in the provision of sanitation infrastructure and services and the 
factors that affect PPP in service delivery.  
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Methodology  
 
Study area and sampling  
Three sub metros within Kumasi Metropolitan Authority (KMA), Oforikrom, Asokwa and Subin were 
selected for the study. The criteria included proximity to ensure easy communication, knowledge of the 
Metro to ensure easy access to information, and small land size that gave the researcher easy access to 
selected communities. Data was collected on perception of use of public toilet and sewerage system, user 
fees, management of public toilet and sewerage systems. The respondents for the interviews and surveys are 
shown in Table 1. 
    
Table 1. Respondents for the study 
Parameter No of 
respondents 
Key Informants KMA -  2 
Sub-Metros – key informants 3 
Private Operators – Public Toilets 11 
Private Operators – Sewerage Systems 3 
Public toilet Attendants 11 
Users Public Toilets under BOT 55 
KMA Owned Public Toilets 15 
Sewerage system 15 
Total 115 
 
Data collection  
The study mainly focused on private sector involved in sanitation infrastructure development Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) and Franchise arrangements for sanitation service delivery. The external factors affecting 
the PPP and the performance of the PPP which were assessed include: the partnership relationships (nature 
of contract, transparency, accountability, trust and confidence, mutual benefit). The performance of the PPP 
was assessed based on user’s perception (based on odour levels, user charges, and cleanliness of facilities) 
and the factors affecting PPP in KMA (political, technical, financial, socio-cultural). 
 
Results and discussions  
 
Nature of partnerships  
Table 2 presents a summary of partnerships arrangements in sanitation delivery in KMA. The partnership 
involving the construction of Public toilet facilities is Build¬-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement and is 
backed by a signed written contract which covers a period of 20years after which the facility is reverted to 
KMA. After installation of the facility, KMA performs a test- run for three months to ascertain the number 
of people expected to visit the facility daily, as well as the daily/monthly expenditure made. Based on the 
results of the test-run, a moderate user fee is set to help the private investor recover the investment cost over 
the contract period. Operations and maintenance expenditure are all covered by the user fees collected. The 
test-run also helps KMA to calculate 15% surtax for the investor to pay to KMA every month. In the event 
of the private investor’s inability to recover the investment cost by the end of the contract, the contract may 
be extended. This model of PPP is very beneficial to both KMA and the private investor. This is because; it 
relieves KMA of the burden of sourcing for funds to perform its responsibility of providing sanitation 
infrastructure for the inhabitants. The private operator on the other hand, gets an investment with a relatively 
longer duration (20 years). 
 
NYARKO, ODURO-KWARTENG & BUSHELL 
 
 
3 
 
Table 2. Summary of nature of partnerships for sanitation 
Aspect of 
Contract 
BOT contract Franchised contract 
Service contract for 
sewerage System O&M 
Ownership Owned by investor. Owned by Assembly Owned by Assembly 
Operation Investor is solely responsible 
for the operation and 
maintenance of the facility. 
Franchisee is responsible for 
the operation of the facility 
Private operator is responsible 
for operation and maintenance 
of the facility 
Formality of 
Contract 
Formal; involves signing of 
contract agreement 
Formal; Signed contract  
 
Formal; Signed contract 
Contract 
duration 
20years 2 years from the day of the 
agreement. 
No specific duration set 
 
Quite unlike what pertains within the BOT, in the franchised management, KMA has already built the 
facility but delegates the management to a private company/individual. The contract duration is 2 years 
which is subject to renewal based on the operator’s satisfactory performance. No case of contract 
termination has been recorded. Investors seek for an extension of contract when they are not able to recover 
their investment cost within the contract duration. Operators employ the services of attendants and cleaners 
to collect user fee and keep the toilet clean respectively. Cost of operations and maintenance are catered for 
by the user fees collected. The operator is expected to pay a franchise fee to KMA every month. 
The nature of the management contract between KMA and a private company for the management of the 
Asafo sewerage system is summarised in Table 1. Ever since the private company was contracted to manage 
the Asafo system in 2006, the contract has never been transferred to another. Under the initial contract 
arrangement, the private operator was paid to manage the system. But due to pressure on the funds allotted 
for sanitation, the private operator was not receiving payments on for the operations and maintenance of the 
system. The private operators were later commissioned to collect an approved user fee to finance their 
activities while the Assembly was relieved of the financial burden of paying the private operator. Hitherto, 
the assembly paid the operators, while they in turn rendered accounts to the assembly. In the current 
situation, the operator pays no surtax to the assembly nor renders accounts to the assembly with regards to 
the revenue generated. At the end of the month, the operator serves every household a demand note, which 
is a bill of the services rendered. KMA approved the user fees as follows: non-storey blocks are charged 
Gh₵3/month (US$0.80), Gh₵5 (US$1.40) for one-storey and Gh₵7 (US$1.80) for two-storey or more. 
Beneficiaries are charged to pay for clearing in the event of a blockage within their property which 
discourages pushing unwanted materials down the sewers. 
 
Partnership transparency and accountability 
Table 3 presents the external factors influencing the partnerships. The accountability for results in the 
partnerships was assessed to find out information flow and the evidence of information asymmetry in 
sanitation. In the case of the BOT, the private operators said they render no accounts to the public sector 
apart from paying surtax. KMA also does not interfere with their income and expenditure as long as they 
pay their surtax. If an operator fails to pay surtax, the operator is served a warning letter and subsequent 
closing down of the facility if the operator still fails to pay the surtax. Within the Franchised management of 
toilets, franchisees pay up to Gh₵50.00 (US$ 14) to the Sub metro as Franchise fee per month. But the 
operator of the Asafo Sewerage system pays nothing to KMA as surtax or franchise fee. 
KMA and the Sub-metros have noted that there is a bit of dishonesty on the side of the private operators 
when it comes to accountability of revenue and payment of surtax. According to KMA, the operators who 
fail to pay do so with the excuse that they were running at a loss. But surtax is calculated based on the 
outcome of test-running the project after installation for about three months. The test-run does not predict 
the patronage levels in the longer term. And so KMA has a fair idea of how much expenditure and revenue 
comes out from a project every month, taking into consideration variations in interest and inflation rates. 
The direct involvement and interference of faithful political party supporters in the management of the 
public toilets is a serious threat to franchised management of public toilet facilities. According to KMA, 
most of these franchisees are affiliated to the ruling party and so they refuse to be accountable to KMA. 
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Table 3. External factor affecting partnerships  
Factors BOT contract Toilet management 
Franchised contract  
Sewerage 
management contract  
Transparency Dishonesty on the part of 
the private investors 
Franchisees dishonest about 
income generated from user 
charges. 
No record of opacity 
Trust and Confidence KMA does not interfere 
with their operations 
KMA does not interfere with 
their operations 
KMA does not interfere 
with their operations 
Accountability Investors are not 
accountable to KMA 
Franchisees fail to render 
accounts to KMA on user 
fees collected 
Operators do not 
account to KMA but 
manage their own 
resources. 
Mutual Benefit KMA receives surtax 
monthly; Investors make 
profit after they have 
recovered their 
investment cost. 
-facilities managed for and 
on behalf of KMA 
-franchisee makes profit from 
collection of user fees 
Operators sometimes 
break even and at other 
times run at a loss.  
 
Franchisees are not sincere in the payment of their monthly franchise fee with the excuse that they are not 
making enough. The franchisees also complained that their attendants were not transparent in accounting for 
the user fees collected and so, they were always running at a loss. Franchisees project their daily revenue 
based on the amount of toilet paper expected to be sold. According to them, the attendants bring along their 
own rolls of paper to sell instead of the Franchisees’. This affects the franchisees adversely as their 
expenditure do not match up with their income. KMA admitted that the franchise management has relieved 
them of the burden of managing the public toilets themselves even though the franchisees are not managing 
the facilities as best as they should. 
 
Trust and confidence 
Interview with the investors (private operators) within the BOT revealed that they were satisfied with the 
partnership since KMA has given them enough room to operate with no stringent monitoring except for 
occasional inspection. According to them, KMA does not probe into their income and expenditure; neither 
interferes with their operations once the private operator faithfully honours the surtax. The private operators 
also revealed that the public toilet attendants were not trustworthy. Some of them related the events when 
some attendants had given out their own anal cleansing materials instead of what had been provided by the 
operator and kept the proceeds. This according to the private operator affects the revenue generated by the 
private operator and cripples their cost recovery rate. KMA on the other hand, trusts the private operators in 
terms of delivering quality service. However occasional visits (announced and unannounced) are made to 
the facilities to put the private operators on check. Since there is no direct overlap between the roles of the 
partners, the private operator could not emphatically say the transparency levels between the partners but 
KMA noted that they trust the operator is doing a good job and there is therefore no need to interfere with 
their operations. KMA does not conduct periodic customer satisfaction surveys. 
 
Mutual benefit  
The private operators admitted that the partnership was very good business especially after they have been 
able to recover their initial investment. The contract is also renewable and so they can keep the facility as 
long as they can, and make good profit. A private interviewed at the Asokwa Sub-metro indicated that he 
had three BOT facilities running concurrently in three different Sub-metros and planning to build one more. 
According to him, the business is good that most investors would not want to hand over the facility to the 
Assembly. Instead they seek for extension under the prevarication of not having recovered their investment 
cost. KMA, on the other hand, admitted that the advantage of the PPP is the fact that the Assembly can 
discharge its responsibility to provide public toilets with no drain on its resources, but rather receiving an 
income (Franchise Fee/ surtax). The surtax may be adjustable by up to 15% in the event of variations in 
water, electricity or desludging tariffs. The private operator of the Asafo Sewerage system, however, 
claimed that they do not receive any external financial aid but run the operations and maintenance on the 
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user fees collected. Therefore, their revenue is not enough. Even though, they do not break even and run at a 
loss some times, the best part is that, they do not owe KMA any financial obligation. 
 
User perception  
Results gave the reasons why some users prefer the BOT to the franchise as follows; 49% because of 
accessibility and proximity to their homes, 67% because of little or no odour compared to the franchise, 84% 
because of cleanliness and 4% because of the technology type (Water closet) which according to them was 
more hygienic and comfortable to use. Despite complain of heat and stench emanating from the facilities 
under franchised management, some users still prefer that to the facilities under BOT. A majority of the 
users relying on the franchise arrangement (80%) indicated that the KMA-owned facility was more reliable 
considering the opening hours of 4am to 11pm each day; and 60% said their reason was the relatively lower 
user fee charged. Majority of the users of BOT run facilities also admitted that the user fee charged (20-40 
Ghana pesewa per visit) was fairer than that charged by the facilities under franchised management (10 
Ghana pesewa) considering the expenditure the operators make on operations and maintenance and the 
service they receive. Figure 1 shows the users perception about the services they are receiving from the 
private operators. It was shown that 35% of users of facilities under BOT were not satisfied claiming the 
user fee was rather too high.  
Results showed most private operators however acknowledged the expenditure made on operations and 
maintenance as well as the quality of service provided and expressed satisfaction about the user fee. 
Interestingly, they admitted that the fee was relatively low and required a review contrary to what the 
investors believed. For the KMA facilities, even though majority 87% of users said the fee was acceptable, 
13% also felt it should be fee-free since the place is almost always unkempt and disinfectants are not used. 
Other complains were the stench, desludging problems, and dilapidated buildings. Other users are also not 
careful with the toilets and misuse them. Contrary to the situation at the BOT facilities, there is no water, 
soap and towels for hand washing.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. User perception of public toilets under PPP 
 
 
Concerning the level of odour at the facilities, while 55% of users of facilities under BOT said there was 
some slight odour, though not strong enough to make one take off his/her dress before entering the cubicles 
as pertains to the KMA owned toilet facilities whereas 87% of users of facilities of under the franchised 
management admitted that the odour was too much. An interesting scenario was observed in the Oforikrom 
Sub-metro, the case of septic tank latrines. The septic tank latrine under BOT at Anwiam is the flushing and 
squatting type while that under franchise management at Kotei is non-flushing but sitting type. At the time 
of visit, it was observed that the facility at Kotei appeared cleaner than that at Anwiam. This goes to affirm 
the 7% of users who rated the franchise managed facilities as very clean. So in the case of Oforikrom Sub 
metro, the type of technology is not a reason people choose the facilities under BOT over those under 
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franchised management. But conditions at these facilities show clearly that the assembly members are more 
interested in the revenue than the comfort of the users. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper investigated the partnership between private sector and the city authority in the development and 
management of sanitation services and infrastructure provision. The introduction of partnerships in 
sanitation sector has been seen in an increase in the number of public toilet facilities serving residents and 
visitors of the sub-metros. The study showed that the facilities under BOT were better managed than the city 
authority-owned franchised managed based on the user perception indicators (odour levels, user charges, 
and cleanliness of facilities. This has resulted in a high patronage of the BOT toilets. Users are also more 
comfortable with the water closet (WC) type than the dry sanitation toilet, which is also a limitation to the 
operations of the facilities under franchised management. The city authority has currently drafted a policy to 
phase out all the dry sanitation and aqua privy toilets over time, hence new ones are not being constructed. 
However, the city authority does not have the means to replace all the dry sanitation and aqua privy toilets 
with WC all at once and thereby depending on private investors to achieve their goal in the long term. This 
can be done by creating more avenues to bring more investors into the sanitation sector to implement BOT.  
The city authority must come out with a clear policy on management of public toilets involving private 
sector participation to avoid political interference and also ensure accountability of franchisees. In 
conclusion, the future of sanitation will depend on how partnerships between the city authority and private 
sector are shaped to ensure access to sanitation and the sustainability of the service. 
 
Lessons learnt  
The study provides some lessons for sustainable management of public toilets. These include: 
1.   The incumbent franchisee has advantage of managing the facilities for a long time since there was no 
effective post contract competition, which would allow other private organisations to bid. This is 
important to improve the service delivery through competition.  
2.   Effective regulation of the PPP is warranted as many aspects of the PPP arrangement could be improved. 
The lack of adequate regulatory mechanisms of public toilets involving private sector participation 
creates avenues for political interference. The management of the sewerage system appears to be open 
ended with no contract duration. The public toilets under franchise management are characterised by 
odour nuisance. 
3.  Inadequate monitoring by KMA (Supervising body) affects the level of service delivery by the operators 
as they usually do not operate in accordance with terms agreed in the contract 
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